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Abstract
It has been proved in many studies that cheap talk has great influence on the players' choices
of strategies in games. But the effect of cheap talk has still not been properly evaluated in
game theory. Based on a novel game model with parameters denoting how one player cares
for the other's payoff, we can take the relations between players into account in games and
extend the use of games theory. In this study the effect of cheap talk was analyzed by using
the new game model.
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Many truths have shown that costless and non-binding pre-play communication 
(cheap talk) has great influence on the players’ strategies in games. But the effect of 
cheap talk has still not been properly estimated in game theory.   
Crawford and Sobel (1982) examined the implications of cheap talk in a game in 
which one player send information to another player who has to choose an action. 
Effect of cheap talk was denoted by cheap talk extension -set of outcomes- that can be 
implemented in equilibrium. Aumann and Hart (1996)  use the notion of a 
bi-martingale to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in a cheap talk extension 
of a two-player game in which only one player has private information.  Farrell and 
Rabin (1996) and Blume (1998) characterize conditions under which cheap talk might 
be useful. Ben-Porath (2003) studies conditions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in 
games, which are extended by adding pre-play communication. 
In fact, it is the relations between players that determine whether a game is 
cooperative or non-cooperative. If we assume the relations between players are either 
cooperative or non-cooperative and don’t take account of the variety of the relations 
in the process of games, the function of cheap talk can’t be estimated properly.   
By using numerical values denoting how one player care for another’s payoff, a 
new game model taking relations between players into account was developed, which 
would extend the use of game theory to more general cases. Cooperative and 
non-cooperative games are both special cases in the frame of new game model. More 
complicated games such as combined games are possible to be analyzed with the new 
model. Then the effect of cheap talk on the players’ choices of strategies was 
investigated. 
 
2. A NEW MODEL FOR GAMES 
 
Definition 1: For players i and j in a game, relation    is a numerical value denotes 
how player i care for player j’s payoff. Specially, there is
ij R
1 = ii R . 
For example,   means  player i don’t care for j’s payoff at all, and i’s attitude 
toward j is non-cooperative. 
0 = ij R
1 = ij R  means  player i cares for j’s income equal as that 
of his own.    indicates in what degree player i cares for j’s income, and i’s 
attitude toward j is cooperative. If 
1 0 < < ij R
0 < ij R  player i would rather to have j suffered 
loss, this means i’s attitude toward j is hostile. 
Definition 2: For players i, j and k in a game, inferred relation  jk i R  is a numerical 
value denotes player i thinks how player j cares for player k’s payoff. Specially, There 
is  1 = jj i R . 
Similarly,  0 = jk i R  means player i thinks player j don’t care for k’s payoff at all. 
0 > jk i R  means player  i thinks player j’s attitude toward k is cooperative. And 
0 < jk i R  means  player i thinks player j ’s attitude toward k is hostile. ij R  and  ji i R   character the relations between player i and j from the viewpoint of 
player i, and the numerical values of them are determined by foregone games. 
We call payoffs set U  objective payoffs because it is the viewpoint of 
a third party and it has no relation to the players’ subjective thought. As opposed to 
objective payoffs, subjective payoffs of a player are his subjective consideration of 
objective payoffs.   
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Definition 3: For a game  ,   denotes how player i cares 
for player j’s payoff, 
{ n n u u S S G , , ; , , 1 1 L L = } ij R
jk i R  denotes player i thinks how player j cares for player k’s 
payoff, we call    objective payoffs and define    subjective 
payoffs of player i, where 
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For example, if objective payoffs are ( ) for two players when they have chose 
strategies ( , ) in a two players’ game, subjective payoffs of player 1 are 
( đ
2 1,u u
1 s 2 s
2 12 1 u R u + 1 21 1 2 u R u + ). Similarly, subjective payoffs of player 2 are ( 2 12 2 1 u R u + đ
).  1 21 2 u R u +
New Game Model:  { } R R U S G ; ; ; =  is a n-player game, where   are 
strategies of players,   are objective payoffs, 
) , , ( 1 n S S S L =
} , , { 1 n u u U L = } , , { 1 n R R R L =  are 
relations between players,  } , , {1 R R R n L =  are inferred relations between players. 
Each player will choose strategy based on his subjective payoffs.   
Subjective payoffs of player i will be equal to the objective payoffs when there is 
0 = = jk i ij R R  ( j i ≠ , ), and it becomes a non-cooperative game when there is  k j ≠
0 = = ik j ji R R  ( j i ≠ ,  ) at the same time. This shows that non-cooperative 
games are just special cases of the new game model. 
k i ≠
Obviously, cooperative games and non-cooperative games are all included in the 
new model. For a game with complete information there should be  jk i R jk R =  for 
any  k j i , , (j i ≠ , ) before the game, which means that the relations between 
any two players is common knowledge. For a game with perfect information there 
should be 
k j ≠
jk i R jk R =   after the game.   
Most of real-life games are games with imperfect and incomplete information 
because of the nature of   and  ij R jk i R .   only can be known by player i exactly 
and other players have to estimate it. Even if player i declares its real value, other 
players have to judge whether it is credible. 
ij R
jk i R  can be verified by the results of 
games and information exchange, but player i can’t make sure  jk i R   always equal to 
.   jk R
  
3. CHEAP TALK IN GAMES 
 
It has been proved by many truths that cheap talk has great influence on players’ 
choice of strategies. How can cheap talk influence the results of games will be 
analyzed based on the new game model. 
Since it is according to subjective payoffs for a player in games to choose his 
strategies, relations between players have influence on every player’s decision-making 
as well as objective payoffs. For instance, the strategies of player i in a two-person 
game are determined by strategy set   and  relations   and  U ij R ji i R .   
When there is  = ij R 0 > ji i R , player i wants to cooperate with player j and knows 
that player j wants to cooperate with player i. Then a promise of cooperation proposed 
by player j is credible for player i here. When there is  = ij R 0 < ji i R , player i expects 
player j to suffer loss in the game and knows that player j expects player i to suffer 
loss in the game. Then a threat of defection proposed by player j is credible for player 
i in this instance. 
When there is   and  0 = ij R 0 = ji i R , neither of promises of cooperation and 
threats of defection is credible for player i . If there is  0 = ji R  and  0 = ij j R  at the 
same time the game is non-cooperative, and cheap talk has little effect on it. 
When there is  ≠ ij R ji i R , the relations between players will be complicated and 
there will be deceiving, commiserating or dedicating behavior in the game. This type 
of problems will be studied in future research.     
In conclusion, cheap talk of cooperation is credible in cooperative games, and 
cheap talk of threat is credible in hostile games.   
One player i with higher   will receive higher long-term payoffs in repeated 
games. This is the motivity for player i to keep    higher (positive at least). Hence, 
ji R
ji R
ji i R   can also denote the degree of credit on how player i trust in player j. The larger 
ji i R  is the higher degree player i trust in player j. Suppose that two players promise 
to each other that they will choose strategy  , the possibility of coming forth of   
is mainly determined by 
* S
* S
ji i R  and  ij j R . 
In the event    doesn’t come true, there must be at least one player whose payoff 
does not accord with his anticipated value after the game. Assume that there is 
difference value 
* S
i u ∆  between player i’s intending payoff and his real one and i 
attribute   to player j’s not abidance of promise, there will be  ij u ∆ ji i R ∆ ) ( ij u f ∆ = , 
where  ji i R ∆  is the change of  ji i R . In general   is in accordance with  ij R ji i R , 
hence not coming forth of   will change at least one player’s credit (
* S ji i R ) and 
attitude ( ) to others.  ij RIn the event of one player  j   departures from his promised strategy  , it usually 
causes other players’ payoffs decreased and consequently causes 
* S
ji i R  and   
decreased, so each player has positivity to keep his promise in general cases. 
ij R
For example, a conceited man  j   in a bar claimed that if anyone wins him in hand 
wrestling he would pay for everyone’s beverage, but he lost the game as a result. Of 
course the man is unwilling to pay, but that action will cause his credit ( ji i R , L jk k R ) 
declined. If he cares for his credit more than that money, he would choose Pay. This 
example indicates that the change of  ji i R  can be looked as a kind of payoff for 
player  j . On condition that a player’s credit lowers, his long-term payoffs will 
decrease and the possibility of successful cheap talk will also decrease. Sometimes 




Cheap talk has an influence on relations between players and consequently changes 
the results of games. On condition that relations between players were neglected the 
function of cheap talk should not be estimated properly. Based on a new game model 
with parameters denoting how one player care for other’s payoff, we could take the 
relations between players into account in games and extended the use of games theory 
to more general cases. Then the importance of cheap talk can be explained with the 
new game model. I believe that more and more economic and social phenomenon will 
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